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In this paper the one-seller/two-buyer problem with buyer externalities is investigated
under the assumption that the two buyers have legal opportunities to cooperate. It
is shown that the Competitive equilibrium and the Core are robust with respect to
negligible externalities and that the range of market prices in the Core belongs to range of
Competitive equilibrium prices. However, these concepts yield no prediction for relatively
severe externalities. Therefore, in order to provide a prediction the Bargaining set and
the Multilateral Nash (MN) solution are also investigated. Surprisingly, in case of an
empty Core the Bargaining set predicts a unique tuple of payos which are independent
of the externalities and each pair of participants is equally likely. Markets with market
imperfections are captured by the MN solution concept. The MN solution yields the
paradox that the seller’s price can be higher under imperfect competition than under
perfect competition.
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1. Introduction
The simplest market situation one can think of is the situation in which one seller
of an indivisible object wants to sell this object to one of two potential buyers. This
problem is known as the one-seller/two-buyer problem and it has received much at-
tention in the literature [see e.g., Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988), Shubik (1982),
Osborne and Rubinstein (1991) for surveys]. Some of the well known standard
results are: There always exists a (possibly degenerated) range of Competitive equi-
librium prices such that demand is equal to supply; every Competitive equilibrium
is ecient; the Core is non-empty; the set of Competitive equilibrium allocations
coincides with the set of Core allocations; the lowest Competitive equilibrium price
can be supported as the equilibrium in an auction [McAfee and McMillan (1989)].
This paper was written while this author was visiting the Netherlands Institute for Advanced
Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences. The kind hospitality and stimulating working
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Whether or not the two buyers have the legal opportunity to enforce cooperation
among them and agree not to buy the object from the seller does not matter
in the results mentioned. In this paper it is assumed that the potential buyers
can both commit not to buy the good and that they can agree on a monetary
transfer as some sort of compensation between them. An important and (as we
will see below) rather crucial assumption in this case for the above results in the
standard one-seller/two-buyer problem is that each potential buyer does not suer
from external eects if the other buyer would buy and then \consume" the good.
However, in many cases this assumption does not hold. For example, the UEFA
(United European Football Association) holds the exclusive broadcasting rights of
all soccer matches in the Champions League and both the commercial and the public
broadcasting organizations would benet from obtaining these rights but at the
same time each organization has to face a serious drop in their own advertisement
incomes when the other organization broadcasts Champions League matches after
obtaining the rights.
In this paper externalities are modelled similar as in Jehiel and Moldovanu
(1995, 1996). Standard theory above suggests that modelling the market equilib-
rium mechanism as an auction would be a good start to investigate markets with
externalities [e.g., Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996)]. However, as is shown below the
equilibrium of the auction is inecient in case the magnitudes of the externalities
are large. Furthermore, with large externalities the benets of and, hence, the in-
centives for cooperation between the two potential buyers increase as well. If the
market equilibrium mechanism is modeled as an auction, then it is a priori excluded
that the pair of potential buyers can form a coalition. In other words, some of the
strategic options available to the potential buyers are excluded. To come back to
our example, in the Netherlands the Dutch commercial and the public broadcasting
organizations have begun talks in order to form a coalition and avoid a harmful
and erce price competition between them.
In this paper attention is restricted to small markets, i.e., markets with two
potential buyers. The motivation for this restriction is that it will be more dicult
to form a (sub)coalition of potential buyers the larger this coalition becomes. We
implicitly regard the eort costs of forming a coalition of potential buyers as a
rapidly increasing and strict convex function in the number of buyers involved in
such a coalition. To put it dierently, we only expect coalitions between potential
buyers if their number is very small.
In this paper the one-seller/two-buyer problem with externalities is modelled
as a cooperative game known as a three-player/three-cake problem [e.g., Binmore
(1986), Houba and Bennett (1997) and Houba (1994)]. This class of problems is
the natural setting to study the economic market situation under consideration,
because in order to obtain the maximum attainable payo in the market it suces
to form a two-player coalition and, therefore, the economic problem can be regarded
as a typical \odd man out" situation. A solution of this problem species which
of the three two-player coalitions forms, who the excluded player is and what the
payo to each of the players is.
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The main purpose of this paper is twofold. First the Competitive equilibrium
concept and the Core concept will be applied to the one-seller/two-buyer problem
with buyer externalities and both sets of solutions are fully characterized. It will
be shown that these sets of outcomes converge to the standard results in absence
of buyer externalities if we let the externalities vanish. So, the standard results
are robust with respect to small values of the externalities. Moreover, the set of
prices for which the object is sold corresponding to each Core allocation is always
contained in the set of Competitive equilibrium prices. However, for rather high
values of the externalities we nd that the Competitive equilibrium as well as the
Core can be equal to the empty set or that the Competitive equilibrium may exist
while the Core may not exist. As in the standard case, both concepts yield an
ecient allocation in case solutions to these concepts exist.
The non-existence of either of these two concepts imposes a serious problem,
because for rather high values of the externalities these two theories fail to provide
a satisfying answer with respect to the selection of reasonable outcomes. Clearly,
this calls for some other solution concept that does not have this drawback. The
second aim of this paper is to investigate whether other \classical" game theoretic
solution concepts, such as the Bargaining set and the (von Neumann{Morgenstern)
Stable set, can provide us with a better understanding of the economic problem.
Furthermore, the relatively recent concept of the Multilateral Nash solution [e.g.,
Bennett (1997)] is analyzed.
It is shown that most of the classical cooperative solution concepts considered
yield similar sets of solutions and, therefore, we regard the Bargaining set as the
representative of these various concepts. If the Core is not empty, then the Bargain-
ing set coincides with the Core. Otherwise, the Bargaining set admits three possible
outcomes associated with the von Neumann{Morgenstern tuple. This uniquely de-
termined tuple species a feasible and ecient partition of each pair’s surplus with
the property that for every pair each individual’s payo, if included in the pair that
actually forms, is equal to this individual’s foregone payo in his alternative pair,
provided that pair would have formed instead.
The Bargaining set can be regarded as a theory in which the competition among
the players is perfect. However, not every market has perfect competition and it
is also worthwhile to study solutions for markets with imperfect competition. At
this point the concept of Multilateral Nash (MN) solution, which extends two-
player axiomatic bargaining theory, becomes interesting. The MN solution is able to
capture market imperfections, such as for instance lock-in eects. This is rst shown
in Houba and Bennett (1997) where for any three-player/three-cake problem each of
the two endpoints of the (possibly degenerated) range of MN solutions corresponds
to the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a particular non-cooperative bar-
gaining model. These two strategic models are the market demand model [e.g.,
Binmore (1986) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1991), Sec. 9.3] and the proposal-
making model [e.g., Binmore (1986), Chatterjee et al. (1993), Moldovanu (1992),
Selten (1981) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1991), Sec. 9.4]. In the market demand
model competition is perfect and the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
August 3, 2002 8:54 WSPC/151-IGTR 00061
144 G. van der Laan & H. Houba
coincides with an MN solution and this MN solution also belongs to an outcome in
the Bargaining set. In the proposal-making model competition is imperfect because
the individual who is in the position to make a proposal suers from a lock-in eect
after having made his proposal. The corresponding MN solution does not lie in the
Bargaining set and this particular MN solution corresponds to the situation with
market imperfections. Thus, a non-cooperative underpinning of this interpretation
can be given.
The remaining of the paper is as follows. In Sec. 2 we introduce the one-
seller/two-buyer problem with buyer externalities and we fully characterize the set
of Competitive equilibria. We also derive the necessary and sucient condition for
(non)emptiness. The standard auction is discussed and rejected as a appropriate
model, because it excludes cooperation between the buyers. This section is con-
cluded with the formulation of the economic problem as a three-player/three-cake
problem. In Sec. 3 we discuss the game-theoretic solution concepts used in this pa-
per. In Sec. 4 we translate the results of Sec. 3 into outcomes of these concepts for
the one-seller/two-buyer externality game and provide the interpretation of these
results. In Sec. 5 some concluding remarks are made.
2. The Economic Problem
In this section we rst introduce the one-seller/two-buyers problem under buyers’
externalities [e.g., Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995, 1996)]. With buyers’ externalities
we mean that a buyer experiences a (negative) externality from the other buyer if
the latter buyer is in possession of the object. For instance, in case of two rms
competing for the ownership of some exclusive technology oered for sale by the
seller, rm i, i = 1; 2, can make a prot wi if he buys the technology, but makes
a loss i  0 if his competitor j 6= i buys the technology. In the remaining of the
paper, let player 3 be the seller and the players 1 and 2 the two potential buyers.
Moreover, let wi be the valuation of player i, i = 1; 2; 3, for the item and let i  0
be the loss of buyer i, i = 1; 2, if buyer j 6= i buys the commodity. Without loss
of generality we assume that w1 > w2 > w3 = 0, because the results for the non-
generic cases w1 = w2 and w2 = w3 = 0 can easily be derived from Fig. 1 and
Table 1.
As a benchmark we rst consider the Competitive equilibrium outcome for var-
ious sets of the values of wi and i, i = 1; 2. Recall that w1 > w2 > 0. Now, let
p  0 be the price for which the commodity is oered for sale. As long as p < w2,
both players want to buy the item and hence p is not an equilibrium price. So, any
equilibrium price p must be at least equal to w2. Now we have the following three
cases:
I : w1  w2 + 2 ;
II : w1 + 1  w2 + 2 > w1 ;
III : w2 + 2  w1 + 1  w1 :
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In the rst case buyer 2 is willing to buy the item as long as p < w2 + 2, because
also buyer 1 is willing to pay this price. Hence, buying the item yields a payo of
w2 − p, which is at least equal to −2, being the payo if buyer 1 owns the item.
For p = w2 + 2 buyer 2 becomes indierent and, hence, any price p satisfying
w2 +2  p  w1 is a Competitive equilibrium price. In such an equilibrium buyer
1 buys the item. The resulting payos, denoted by ui, i = 1; 2; 3, are u1 = w1 − p,
u2 = −2 and u3 = p. Observe that the total payo equals w1 − 2. Since w1 
w2 + 2 we have that w1 − 2  w2  maxf0; w2 − 1g and, hence, the total
payo is maximized. Thus, under Case I the trade resulting from competition is
ecient.
In the two other cases there does not exist a Competitive equilibrium price.
Consider Case II and rst suppose p > w2 +2. Then buyer 2 does not want to buy
the item and, hence, buyer 1 wants to pay at most w1. Second, suppose that p < w1.
Then buyer 2 wants to buy because buyer 1 is willing to pay this price. So, both
buyers want to buy and so p < w1 cannot be an equilibrium price. Finally, consider
w1  p  w2 + 2. In this case a buyer i, i = 1; 2, only wants to buy the good in
order to prevent the other buyer from buying. So, i wants to buy at p if and only
if j 6= i wants to buy. As soon as i leaves the market also his competitor j leaves
the market. Therefore, the demand is either 0 or 2 and so an equilibrium does not
exist. The same reasoning holds in Case III.
Observe that in Case II it is optimal to allocate the item to player 1 if w1−2 > 0
and to player 3 otherwise. Analogously in Case III it is optimal to allocate the item
to player 2 if w2 − 1 > 0 and to player 3 otherwise. Reversely this implies that
there does not exist an equilibrium price if max[w1 − 2; w2 − 1]  0, i.e., if not
selling the item yields an ecient allocation. Hence the main results of the above
analysis are as follows:
Theorem 2.1 (Competitive Equilibrium).
(E1) A Competitive equilibrium price exists if and only if 2  w1 − w2: In this
case the interval of Competitive equilibrium prices is [w2 + 2; w1] and the
good is sold to player 1: The equilibrium allocation is ecient ;
(E2) if it is ecient not to sell the item; then there does not exist a Competitive
equilibrium price:
One standard result for the one-seller/two-buyer problem without externalities
is that the lowest Competitive equilibrium price (and outcome) corresponds to the
unique Nash equilibrium outcome of both the rst-price and second-price sealed-
bid auction. The unique Nash equilibrium price of this auction in case of buyer
externalities is equal to minfw1 + 1; w2 + 2g and the buyer with valuation equal
to maxfw1 +1; w2 +2g obtains the good [e.g., Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996)]. As
long as 2  w1 − w2, i.e., a Competitive equilibrium exists, the Nash equilibrium
of the auction corresponds to the lowest Competitive equilibrium price, a result
similar to the standard case without externalities. Also in case 2 > w1 − w2 the
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Nash equilibrium of the auction still exists. However, in this case the outcome of
the auction is not longer ecient. So, the eciency of the outcome of the auction
for the case without externalities only extends to the case with externalities for
small externalities (implying robustness of the standard results). In case 1 > w2
and 2 > w1 the Nash equilibrium yields an inecient allocation implying the
standard eciency result for auctions does not hold in general if the players have
externalities.
In case that the magnitudes of both externalities are large it is clear that the two
potential buyers could gain from forming a two-player coalition in order to prevent
that one of them buys the good. Of course, this means that it must be possible
for both buyers to commit themselves to not buying and that transfers between
the buyers are not excluded. They can certainly commit if they have the legal
opportunity to write a binding agreement or contract in which both agree not to
buy the object as well as include some monetary transfer. It is clear that modelling
the market as an auction excludes a priori the formation of the two-buyer coalition.
In order to obtain insights into market situations in which buyers can credibly form
a coalition we will model the market as a cooperative game with transferable utility.
We proceed by dening the one-seller/two-buyer problem as a transferable
utility game (N ; v^), where N = f1; 2; 3g is the set of players and v^: 2N ! R the
characteristic function dening for any subset S ofN the payo of the coalition S of
players. Under the assumption that the payo of a single player i equals the payo
this player can guarantee himself in the worse case with respect to the behaviour
of the other players, the characteristic function is given by
v^(1) = −1; v^(2) = −2; v^(3) = 0; v^(1; 2) = 0 ;
v^(1; 3) = w1; v^(2; 3) = w2; and v^(1; 2; 3) = maxf0; w1 − 2; w2 − 1g :
Observe that for i = 1; 2, the item is sold to player i if the two-player coalition
fi; 3g forms, whereas the item is not sold if the two-player coalition f1; 2g forms. In
the latter case the two buyers agree to stay out of the market. Clearly, this option
maximizes the total payo in case both 1 > w2 and 2 > w1, i.e., in case the
prot which can be realized by one of the buyers is less than the externality of
the other buyer and hence the industry is hurt by adapting the new technology.
Normalizing the payos of the one-player coalitions equal to zero, we get the game
(N ; v) dened by the characteristic function v: 2N ! R given by
v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0 ;
v(1; 2) = 1 + 2; v(1; 3) = 1 + w1; v(2; 3) = 2 + w2 ;
and
v(1; 2; 3) = 1 + 2 + maxf0; w1 − 2; w2 − 1g :
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As noticed in Houba (1994) this bargaining problem under externalities is equivalent
to a three-player/three-cake problem.a This can be easily seen as follows. Rewriting
the last equation as v(1; 2; 3) = maxf1 + 2; 1 + w1; 2 + w2g, we get that
v(1; 2; 3) = maxfv(1; 2); v(1; 3); v(2; 3)g. Therefore there always exists at least one
two-player coalition fi; jg, which can divide the total payo v(1; 2; 3) by cooperating
and excluding the third player. Hence, the grand coalition will never form and only
the payos of the two-player coalitions matter. Therefore the game is equivalent to
a three-player/three-cake problem, i.e., a game in which only pairs of players have
the possibility of forming a coalition and dividing the associated cake (payo). In
fact, in a three-player/three-cake game a coalition structure f[i; j]; [k]g will form
where [i; j] denotes the coalition fi; jg which forms and [k] denotes the third player
excluded from the coalition.
This section is concluded with the denition of the von Neumann{Morgenstern
vector and tuple.b For a given pair [i; j], let zij = (zi; zj) be a feasible and ecient
payo vector, i.e., a pair of non-negative real numbers such that zi + zj = v(i; j).
That means the vector zij induces the feasible payo vector x = (x1; x2; x3)
> 2 R3
dened by xi = zi, xj = zj and xk = 0 for k 6= i; j with coalition structure
f[i; j]; [k]g. We now have the following denition.
Denition 2.1 (Von Neumann Morgenstern (VNM) vector). Let z =
(z1; z2; z3)
> 2 R3+ be such that for any pair [i; j], zij = (zi; zj) is feasible and e-
cient. Then the vector z is the Von Neumann{Morgenstern vector with the triple
of payo vectors fz12; z13; z23g as the corresponding Von Neumann{Morgenstern
tuple.
By denition the VNM vector z = (z1; z2; z3)
> is a solution of the system of
equations
z1 + z2 = v(1; 2) ; z1 + z3 = v(1; 3) ; z2 + z3 = v(2; 3) : (1)
Although this system has a unique solution, this solution only forms a VNM vector
if all of its components are non-negative. Otherwise, the VNM vector does not exist.
In case zi > 0 for all i 2 N at a VNM vector z, we have that z1 + z2 + z3 >
maxfv(1; 2); v(1; 3); v(2; 3)g = v(1; 2; 3). So, except for the boundary case that
zi = 0 for at least one i, the players cannot realize simultaneously the payos
of the VNM vector. So, in general the VNM vector yields a non-feasible outcome.
Nevertheless, the VNM vector has a nice interpretation. At such a vector any player
is indierent in choosing one of the other two players in forming a pair to divide
the associated cake. Recall that at most one pair can be formed. So, player i gets
aThis is no longer true in the more general case that any of the three players (buyers and seller)
may experience externalities form the other two players [e.g., Cornet and van der Laan (1995) for
a thorough discussion].
bBy naming this vector and corresponding tuple after von Neumann and Morgenstern we follow
the terminology in Binmore (1986). Below it will be shown that this tuple characterizes the Stable
set in case the Core is empty.
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his VNM payo zi if he forms a pair with either player j or k and his partner in
this pair gets zj respectively zk. The player not in the pair that forms gets his
(normalized) payo equal to zero.
Observe that any of the three pairs may form. So, any element zij of the VNM
tuple corresponds with a payo vector x as dened above and with a coalition
structure f[i; j]; [k]g. Although any pair may form, the probabilities with which the
pairs are formed need not to be equal. So, let pij be the probability that the pair [i; j]
forms. Then the expected payo Ei of player i equals Ei = (pij + pik)zi, i = 1; 2; 3.
Hence E1 + E2 + E3 = pijv(ij) + pikv(ik) + pjkv(jk)  maxfv(ij); v(ik); v(jk)g.
Because also inecient pairs (i.e., pairs not realizing the maximum payo) may
have a positive probability to form, the expected payo is not an ecient outcome.
The realized outcome is only ecient if an ecient pair forms.
3. Game Theoretic Solutions
Several game theoretic solutions for the three-player/three-cake problem have been
analyzed in Houba and Bennett (1997) and more extensively in Houba (1994). In
this section some of these concepts are introduced and a brief derivation of the
relevant results is given. The rst solution concept we want to consider is the Core
in payo congurations [e.g., Aumann and Dreze (1974), Binmore (1986) and Houba
(1994)].
As is well-known, the Core is the set of all undominated payo vectors, i.e., the
set of all vectors x 2 R3 satisfying Pi2S xi  v(S) S  N . Observe that for each
element x = (x1; x2; x3)
> in the Core we have that xk = 0 for at least one k. To show
this, let [i; j] be a pair such that v(i; j) = maxfv(1; 2); v(1; 3); v(2; 3)g = v(1; 2; 3).
Now, if for k 6= i, j, xk > 0, then xi+xj < v(i; j) and, hence, x is dominated through
the coalition fi; jg. So, for each element x in the Core we have implicitly a coalition
structure f[i; j]; [k]g with coalition [i; j] the pair which divides its associated cake
v(i; j) and excludes player k from cooperation [e.g., Aumann and Dreze (1974)].
The following theorem has been proven in Binmore (1986) and Houba (1994)
and shows the relationship between the Core and the VNM vector of a three-
player/three-cake game.
Theorem 3.1 (Existence of Core and VNM vector). Let (z1; z2; z3)
> be the
unique solution of (1): Then
(a) the Core consists of multiple elements if and only if zi < 0 for at least one
i 2 N ;
(b) the VNM vector (z1; z2; z3)
> species the players’ payos corresponding to the
unique element of the Core if and only if zi  0 for all i 2 N and zi = 0 for at
least one i 2 N ;
(c) the Core is empty if and only if zi > 0 for all i 2 N :
Theorem 3.1 states that the Core contains multiple elements if and only if the
VNM vector does not exist, i.e., if the system of equations (1) does not have a
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non-negative vector. Reversely, the VNM vector exists and is strictly positive if
and only if the Core is empty. If the system (1) has a non-negative solution with
at least one of the components equal to zero, then the VNM vector is the unique
element of the Core. It is important to observe the dierence in the interpretation
of the unique Core element and the VNM tuple. Therefore, suppose that zk = 0.
Then the unique Core solution says that the pair [i; j], i 6= k and j 6= k, is the only
pair that forms and partitions its cake v(i; j) according to zij = (zi; zj). According
to the VNM tuple any pair [h; k] may form with the element zhk of the VNM
tuple as the partition of its cake v(h; k). Observe that only if the pair [i; j] forms
the payos obtained from the VNM vector are equal to the payos obtained from
the Core solution.
In Houba (1994) it is also shown that both the Bargaining set and the Stable
set are also fully characterized by Theorem 3.1. These results are summarized in
the next theorem. Therefore, let (z1; z2; z3)
> be again the solution of (1) and let k
be the index such that zk = minj zj. Observe that if zk < 0, then zi > 0, zj > 0
and v(i; j) = maxfv(1; 2); v(1; 3); v(2; 3)g for i, j 6= k.
Theorem 3.2 (Characterization of Bargaining set and Stable set). Let
(z1; z2; z3)
> be the solution of (1) and let k be the index such that zk = minj zj :
Then we have the following cases:
(a) zk < 0: then the Bargaining set is equal to the Core and the Stable set is given
by the set
fx 2 R3+jxi + xj = v(i; j); i; j 6= k ; and xk = 0g :
At any outcome of this set the pair [i; j]; i; j 6= k; forms a coalition and divides
its associated cake;
(b) zk  0: then both the Bargaining set and the Stable set are given by the collection
of the three vectors f(z1; z2; 0)>; (z1; 0; z3)>; (0; z2; z3)>g; Any pair may form:
Player i gets payo zi if he is in the pair that forms: Otherwise the player gets
a payo equal to 0:
Combining Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 we see that the Bargaining set coincides with
the Core if the VNM vector does not exist (Case (a) of Theorem 3.1). In this case
the Stable set is given by the set of payo vectors satisfying that the two players
which can realize the highest payo divide this payo among themselves. In case
the VNM vector exists (Cases (b) and (c) of Theorem 3.1) the Bargaining set is
equal to the Stable set and consists of the three payo vectors induced by the VNM
tuple. So, the Bargaining set and the Stable set immediately follow from the Core
and the VNM vector. Therefore we do not further discuss the Bargaining set and
Stable set in the remaining of the paper.
We now want to consider the concept of the Multilateral Nash solution. Suppose
that for every pair [i; j] all three players in N conjecture that xij 2 R2+ represents
the partition of the cake v(i; j) for this pair, with the convention that the pair [i; j]
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will not form if xij is not feasible. Then the tuple x = fx12; x13; x23g represents
the conjectured partitions for every cake. Given these conjectured partitions x each
member of the pair [i; j] has a conjectured outside option, namely abandon the pair
[i; j] and go to the third player and form a coalition with this player. It is assumed
that all three players in N conjecture that the value of player i’s outside option
oiji (x) = maxf0; v(i; k) − xikk g, where xikk denotes player k’s conjectured payo in
xik. The reason for this is that if xik is not feasible, then player i can only execute
his outside option if he gives in player k’s demand xikk in order to form the pair
[i; k]. This gives us a tuple o(x) = fo12(x); o13(x); o23(x)g of conjectured outside
options for each pair. Now, in case of an infeasible pair of outside options oij(x)
it is assumed that the members of the pair [i; j] agree not to form this pair and
to execute their outside options oij(x). In case of a feasible pair of outside options
oij(x) the members of the pair [i; j] have the possibility to form a coalition and to
negotiate about the division of the cake. It is assumed that the resulting agreement
of these negotiations is the constrained Nash bargaining solution arg max(xi;xj) xixj ,
s.t. (xi; xj)  oij(x) [e.g., Sutton (1986)]. In other words, it is assumed that the
negotiated agreement N ij(o(x)) within the pair [i; j] is given by
N ij(o(x)) =
8><>:
arg max
(xi;xj)oij(x)
xixj ; if o
ij(x) is feasible,
oij(x) otherwise:
Finally, consistency requirements impose the condition that for each pair [i; j] the
conjectured agreement xij is equal to N ij(o(x)), i.e., a xed point argument. All
these considerations lead to the following denition.
Denition 3.1 (Multilateral Nash (MN) solution). A tuple x = fx12; x13;
x23g is a multilateral Nash solution if
xij = N ij(o(x)) ; for all [i; j] 2 f[1; 2]; [1; 3]; [2; 3]g :
For every MN solution x = fx12; x13; x23g it holds that there exists a vector
y = (y1; y2; y3) 2 R3+ such that xiji = xiki = yi, for all i, j, k 2 N and i 6= j,
i 6= k [e.g., Bennett (1997)]. Analogously to the VNM vector we summarize an MN
solution x = fx12; x13; x23g by its associated vector of demands y = (y1; y2; y3). The
i-th component can be thought of as an endogenous reservation value for player i
and player i does not participate in any pair if he does not get at least a payo of
yi. For details we refer to Bennett (1997) or Houba and Bennett (1997).
In the remaining of the paper, let the three players i, j, k be ordered such that
v(i; j)  v(i; k)  v(j; k) :
The following denitions will prove to be useful in characterizing the set of MN
solutions.
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Denition 3.2. If v(i; j)  v(i; k)  v(j; k), then we say that
(a) Player i is the dominant player, player k is the dominated player and player j
is the modal player.
(b) If v(i; j) > 2v(i; k), then players i and j are the Nash-dominant pair.
We now consider the two cases, either the pair [i; j] is Nash-dominant, or
not. In the rst case the pair [i; j] is called the Nash dominant pair, because
the standard Nash bargaining solution with disagreement point (0; 0) of this
pair’s cake gives 12v(i; j) > v(i; k) = maxfv(i; k); v(j; k)g to each player in this
pair and, hence, none of these two players can improve by leaving the pair
[i; j] and form a pair with the third player k. Note that for any tuple x it
holds that oiki (x)  v(i; k) and ojkj (x)  v(j; k). So, for any tuple x it im-
mediately follows from the denitions of N ij(o(x)) and the Nash-dominant pair
that yi = yj =
1
2v(i; j). Then yk = 0 follows also. Thus, if [1; 2] is the Nash-
dominant pair, then the vector y = (12v(1; 2);
1
2v(1; 2); 0)
> is the unique MN vector
of demands. The Nash-dominant pair [i; j] is the only pair that can form, be-
cause xik and xjk are not feasible for the pairs [i; k] respectively [j; k]. In this
case for each of these players the payo is at least equal to the maximum pay-
o they can obtain if forming a pair with the third player. Therefore, forming
a pair with the third player k is not a relevant outside option for the players
in the Nash-dominant pair. Observe that this unique MN solution lies in the
Core.
If the pair [i; j] is not Nash-dominant, then the MN solution implies that the
dominant player is always in the pair that forms. The reasoning behind this is that
the dominant player i has always the possibility to oer the modal player j a payo
of at least v(j; k), which is the maximum payo that player j can obtain in forming
a pair with the dominated player k. So, player i has the possibility to object against
the pair [j; k]. In characterizing the set of MN solutions for this case it is convenient
to write down the following system of (in)equalities:
yi + yj = v(i; j) ; (2)
yi + yk = v(i; k) ; (3)
yi  v(i; j)=2 ; (4)
yj + yk  v(j; k) ; (5)
yk  0 ; (6)
The next lemma follows immediately.
Lemma 3.1.
(a) The system of (in)equalities (2){(6) has a (possibly degenerated) line piece of
non-negative solutions y 2 R3+ if and only if the pair [i; j] is not Nash-dominant:
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(b) If the VNM vector does not exists; then the system of (in)equalities (2){(6) has
the non-empty set of solutions
Y =

y 2 R3+jyj = v(i; j)− yi ; yk = v(i; k)− yi ;
yi 2

1
2
v(i; j); v(i; j)− v(j; k)

;
which reduces to the unique point y = (12v(1; 2);
1
2v(1; 2); 0)
> when v(i; k) =
1
2v(i; j):
If the VNM vector z exists; then the system of (in)equalities (2){(6) has the
non-empty set of solutions
Y =

y 2 R3+jyj = v(i; j)− yi ; yk = v(i; k)− yi ; yi 2

1
2
v(i; j); zi

;
which includes the VNM vector z: When v(i; j) = v(i; k) = v(j; k); then
Y = fzg:
If the pair [i; j] is not Nash-dominant, then the dominant player i will form a
pair with either the modal player j or the dominated player k. So, the solution
must satisfy Eqs. (2) and (3). As in the VNM vector, he is indierent between
these two alternatives. Moreover, player i can always claim at least an amount of
at least 12v(i; j), being the payo obtained from the Nash solution when he forms a
pair with the modal player j. This is reflected by inequality (4). The upper bound
of the payo of the dominant player i follows from the condition that zj + zk
must be at least equal to v(j; k) (inequality (5)), preventing that the modal and the
dominated player can improve from forming a pair together, and from the condition
that all payos must be non-negative, which is guaranteed by zk  0 (inequality
(6)). Finally, observe that only the pairs [i; j] and [i; k] can form. So, player i can
play o both j and k, because i can realize zi in either [i; j] or [i; k], whereas the
players j and k can only form a pair with i. However, this is only reasonable for
any MN solution with zj + zk > v(j; k). At the MN solution z of the system (2){(6)
satisfying zj + zk = v(j; k) we have that z also solves the system (1) determining
the VNM vector. According to this latter solution all pairs may form. For values of
zi above the VNM value it becomes benecial for the other players to form the pair
[j; k]. This threat puts the VNM outcome as an upper bound on how far player i
can go in playing o the players j and k. So, player i reaches its maximum payo
at the VNM vector. Moreover, as this solution the threat of the other players to
form a pair becomes credible.
We summarize the above results for the MN solutions by stating the following
theorem, which also follows directly by applying the results in Houba and Bennett
(1997).
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Theorem 3.3 (Multilateral Nash solution).
(a) If the pair [i; j] is Nash-dominant; then the MN solution is unique and charac-
terized by the unique demand vector y = (y1; y2; y3)
> given by yi = yj = 12v(i; j)
and yk = 0: The resulting coalition structure is given by f[i; j]; [k]g:
(b) If no pair is Nash dominant; then the MN solution is (generic) non-unique; the
set of associated demand vectors is equal to the set Y and either f[i; j]; [k]g or
f[i; k]; [j]g results as a coalition structure. If the VNM vector z exists, then for
y = z (and only if y = z) the coalition structure f[j; k]; [i]g can also results:
In Houba and Bennett (1997) it is shown that the endpoints of the curve of
MN solutions correspond to two non-cooperative bargaining models, namely the
market demand model and the proposal-making model. The rst one describes a
negotiation situation in which competition among the three players is perfect. The
outcome of this bargaining model corresponds with either a Core solution or the
VNM vector. In the second model competition among the three players is imperfect
because each player faces a lock-in eect. If the pair [i; j] is Nash dominant, then this
lock-in eect plays no role for the players i and j, which is reflected in the fact that
the same outcome results as in the market bargaining model. However, otherwise
the dominant player i suers from the lock-in eect, (because his payo is less than
in the market bargaining model) and receives a payo of at least 12v(i; j) as if he
is in a two-player negotiation situation together with player j bargaining over the
cake v(i; j) while player k is not present at all. As is argued in Houba and Bennett
(1997) the intermediate MN solutions can also be regarded to reflect imperfect
competition among the three players. This interpretation is nicely illustrated by
the unique equilibrium in the wage bargaining model in Shaked and Sutton (1984),
because this equilibrium corresponds also to a MN solution and the equilibrium
changes due to the lock-in eect.
4. Solutions to The Market Situation
In this section we translate the game theoretic solutions of the previous section into
the original market problem. First, the VNM vector z that solves the system (1) as
a function of the values wi and i, i = 1; 2, is given by
z =

1 +
w1 − w2
2
; 2 +
w2 − w1
2
;
w1 + w2
2
>
:
Since by assumption w1 > w2 > 0 and i  0, i = 1; 2 these values are non-negative
and hence the VNM vector exists if 2  w1−w22 , i.e., if the externality of buyer 2 is
large enough. Observe that both the VNM vector and the Competitive equilibrium
exist if w1−w22  2  w1 −w2. In the remaining of the paper we only consider the
payos of the underlying one-seller/two-buyers problem and we denote these payos
by u = (u1; u2; u3). Recall that any solution z = (z1; z2; z3) of the normalized game
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yields payos ui = zi − i, i = 1; 2 and u3 = z3 to the two buyers and the seller.
So, the payos at the VNM vector become
u =

w1 − w2
2
;
w2 − w1
2
;
w1 + w2
2
>
;
which are independent of the externalities. So, at the VNM vector player 1 gets
a payo u1 =
w1−w2
2 if he forms a pair with either player 2 or player 3. In the
rst case the two buyers agree not to buy and buyer 2 pays a compensation w1−w22
to buyer 1. The seller stays outside the coalition and realizes a payo of zero. In
the second case buyer 1 buys the item against price w1+w22 . Now, buyer 2 stays
outside the coalition and gets a payo of −2. If the pair [2; 3] forms then buyer 2
buys the item against price w1+w22 and gets buyer 1 a payo of −1. So, if a player
is in the pair that forms, his payo is not only independent of the externalities,
but also of his partner. However, only the two players in the coalition realize their
VNM payos. The player outside the coalition can not realize his VNM payo. If
2 =
w1−w2
2 then the VNM payo of player 2 is u2 =
w2−w1
2 = −2 and does
not depend on being in or out the pair. In this case z2 = 0 and hence it follows
from Theorem 3.1, case (b) that the VNM vector is equal to the unique element of
the Core. However, the Core payos are only realized if the pair [1; 3] forms. The
resulting outcome is not ecient and also not in the Core if according to the VNM
vector one of the other pairs forms. According to Theorem 3.1, case (c) we have
that the Core is empty if the VNM vector is strictly positive, i.e., if 2 >
w1−w2
2 .
In this case an ecient outcome is only achieved if the (ecient) pair [i; j] forms.
For 2  w1−w2 (Case I of the Competitive solution) this is the pair [1; 3]. On the
other hand it follows from the cases (a) and (b) that the Core exists if system (1)
does not have a strictly positive solution, i.e., if 2  w1−w22 . So, if the Core is not
empty, there exists a competitive price. It follows from straightforward calculations
that the set of Core outcomes is given by C = fu 2 R3ju1 = w1 − u3; u2 =
−2; w2 + 2  u3  w1 − 2g. Summarizing these results we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Core solution and VNM vector).
(C1) The Core is given C = fu 2 R3ju1 = w1 − u3; u2 = −2; w2 + 2  u3 
w1 − 2g and hence is non-empty if and only if 2  w1−w22 ;
(C2) if the Core is not empty; then there exists a Competitive equilibrium price and
the interval [w2 + 2; w1 − 2] of prices corresponding to the Core belongs to
the interval [w2 + 2; w1] of Competitive equilibrium prices;
(C3) the VNM vector exists if and only if 2  w1−w22 and the corresponding payo
vector is given by u = (w1−w22 ;
w2−w1
2 ;
w1+w2
2 )
>:
Comparing the Theorems 2.1 and 4.1 it follows immediately from the properties
E1, C1 and C2 that the Core does not coincide with the set of Competitive equilibria
if the externalities are strictly positive. In particular we have that the Core is empty
and the set of Competitive equilibria is not empty if w1−w22 < 2  w1 − w2.
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Observe that the set of Core prices is a subset of the set of Competitive equilibrium
outcomes, namely the outcomes corresponding to the Competitive prices w2 +2 
p  w1 − 2. For prices w1 − 2 < p  w1, the Competitive equilibrium outcome
is outside the Core, because in this case the two buyers can do better by agreeing
not to buy. Moreover we see that the Core shrinks if 2 increases and reduces to
just one point for the earlier found value 2 =
w1−w2
2 . In this case the unique
Core point coincides with the VNM vector and the outcome corresponds to the
minimum value w2 + 2 of the Competitive equilibrium price. Furthermore, an
increase in the value of externality of buyer 2 increases the minimum Core payo of
buyer 1 and decreases the maximum Core payo of buyer 1 with the same amount.
With respect to the Core outcomes the externality of buyer 2 eects the outcomes
of buyer 1 and the seller equally. Finally, observe that the Core outcomes do not
depend on the externality of buyer 1. Obviously, this is because at any Core solution
the pair [1; 3] forms.
We now consider the set of MN solutions. First of all, it follows from straightfor-
ward calculations that only the pair [1; 3] can be a Nash-dominant pair. To be so,
we must have that w1+12 > maxfw2+2; 1+2g, which implies that 2 < w1−w22 .
Hence, if [1; 3] is indeed a Nash-dominant pair, then the corresponding unique MN
solution lies in the Core and hence the Core is not empty. The only other case that
there exists a unique MN solution is when w1 + 1 = w2 + 2 = 1 + 2. Then
this unique solution is equal to the VNM vector. In all other cases there exists a set
of MN solutions, depending on the values of the parameters. According to the six
permutations (i; j; k) over the set of players, there are six dierent regimes. Recall
that i is the dominant player, j is the modal player and k is the dominated player.
For given values of w1 and w2 these six regimes can be drawn in the (1; 2) space
and are determined by the three equations v(1; 2) = v(1; 3), v(1; 2) = v(2; 3) and
v(1; 3) = v(2; 3). The rst equation gives the line
2 = w1 − w2 + 1 ;
the second equation the line 1 = w2 and the last equation the line 2 = w1. These
lines are drawn heavily in Fig. 1 for given values w1 and w2 such that
1
2w1 > w2.
Moreover in this gure the equation
v(1; 3) = 2 maxfv(1; 2); v(2; 3)g
is represented by the curve DNE. The region \NASH" below this curve is the region
of values for which the pair [1; 3] is Nash-dominant.
Below the horizontal lines 2 =
w1−w2
2 and 2 = w1−w2 the Core is not empty,
respectively there exists a Competitive equilibrium. Figure 1 does not change much
if w2 > w1=2. In this case the point D moves to the horizontal 1-axes, implying
that then the origin does not belong the NASH-dominant region. We will explain
the dashed lines in the gure later.
We now consider the six dierent regions. In region A1 we have that i = 3,
j = 1 and k = 2. According to the existence of the Core and/or the Competitive
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Fig. 1. The partition of the (1; 2) space into regions of dominance.
equilibrium, the regions A1 and B1 (in which i = 1, j = 3 and k = 2) are partitioned
up into three subregions a, b and c. For each (sub)region all the data are given in
Table 1. This table characterizes each region by the ordering (i; j; k) of the players
with respect to domination, respectively the Nash dominant pair, and gives the
payo vectors of the set of the MN solutions, and, if exist, the VNM vector, the set
of Core solutions and the set of Competitive outcomes. Outside the Nash region
the set of MN solutions follows from solving the system (2){(6). The upper bound
of the payo ui of the dominant player i follows from (6) in A1a and B1a, and from
(5) in all other regions. The lower bound follows from (4). Recall that in case of the
VNM vector and the MN-solutions a player only realizes the reported payo if he
is in the pair that forms. If not, he stays at his initial value. Moreover, with respect
the MN solutions outside the NASH region only the pairs (i; j) and (i; k) can form.
Finally observe that at the point V in Fig. 1 we have that 1 = w2 and 2 = w1.
So, at this point all two-player coalition have the same value in the normalized
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Table 1. The Competitive equilibria and game theoretic solutions for various values of the externalities. The payo u3 is equal
to the price the seller would get if he is included in the pair that forms.
Region and The players’ payos
ordering u1 u2 u3
NASH MN w1 − u3 −2 1
2
(w1 + 1)
pair [1; 3] Core w1 − u3 −2 [w2 + 2; w1 − 2],
is dominant Comp w1 − u3 −2 [w2 + 2; w1],
A1a MN w1 − u3 w2 − u3

1
2
(w1 + 1); w2 + 2

,
(3; 1; 2) Core w1 − u3 −2 [w2 + 2; w1 − 2]
Comp w1 − u3 −2 [w2 + 2; w1]
A1b MN w1 − u3 w2 − u3

1
2
(w1 + 1);
1
2
(w1 + w2)

,
(3; 1; 2) VNM
1
2
(w1 − w2) 1
2
(w2 − w1) 1
2
(w1 +w2)
Comp w1 − u3 −2 [w2 + 2; w1]
A1c MN w1 − u3 w2 − u3

w1 + 1
2
;
w1 +w2
2

,
(3; 1; 2) VNM
1
2
(w1 − w2) 1
2
(w2 − w1) 1
2
(w1 +w2)
A2 MN w1 − u3 w2 − u3

w2 + 2
2
;
w1 +w2
2

,
(3; 2; 1) VNM
1
2
(w1 − w2) 1
2
(w2 − w1) 1
2
(w1 +w2)
B1a MN

1
2
(w1 − 1); 2

−u1 w1 − u1
(1; 3; 2) Core [2; w1 − w2 − 2] −2 w1 − u1
Comp [0; w1 −w2 − 2] −2 w1 − u1
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Table 1. (Continued).
Region and The players’ payos
ordering u1 u2 u3
B1b MN

1
2
(w1 − 1); 1
2
(w1 − w2)

−u1 w1 − u1
(1; 3; 2) VNM
1
2
(w1 −w2) 1
2
(w2 − w1) 1
2
(w1 +w2)
Comp [0; w1 −w2 − 2] −2 w1 − u1
B1c MN

1
2
(w1 − 1); 1
2
(w1 − w2)

−u1 w1 − u1
(1; 3; 2) VNM
1
2
(w1 −w2) 1
2
(w2 − w1) 1
2
(w1 +w2)
B2 MN

1
2
(2 − 1); 1
2
(w1 −w2)

−u1 w1 − u1
(1; 2; 3) VNM
1
2
(w1 −w2) 1
2
(w2 − w1) 1
2
(w1 +w2)
C1 MN −u2

1
2
(w2 − 2); 1
2
(w2 −w1)

w2 − u2
(2; 3; 1) VNM
1
2
(w1 −w2) 1
2
(w2 − w1) 1
2
(w1 +w2)
C2 MN −u2

1
2
(1 − 2); 1
2
(w2 − w1)

w2 − u2
(2; 1; 3) VNM
1
2
(w1 −w2) 1
2
(w2 − w1) 1
2
(w1 +w2)
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game and therefore the MN solution is unique and equal to the VNM vector. At
the point N we have that the VNM vector is equal to both the unique MN solution
and the unique Core outcome.
Inspection of Table 1 leads to the following observations. First of all, depending
on the values of the externalities, any dominance ordering of the players can occur.
Obviously, in the one-seller/two-buyers game without externalities either the pair
[1; 3] is Nash-dominant (if w12  w2) or the seller is the dominant player. In case
of externalities this is only true for low values of the externalities. High values
give the buyers an incentive to stick together and to agree not to buy. So, the
occurrence of externalities has two opposite eects on the position of the seller. If
he is in the pair that forms, he obtains a higher price. On the other hand, if he is
not in the pair, then he is left with a payo of zero. Observe that the value of u3
equals the price against the item is sold in case the seller is in the pair that forms.
So, Table 1 also provides the price of the item. Observation of the table therefore
immediately shows that the price induced by the VNM vector equals the maximum
of the set of prices induced by the set of MN solutions if the seller is the dominant
player (case A). In case one of the buyers is the dominant player (Cases B and C)
we have that the price induced by the VNM vector equals the minimum of the set
of prices induced by the set of MN solutions. We now consider the dierent regions
in more detail.
In region A1a (the dominant seller forms a pair with either the modal buyer
1 or the dominated buyer 2) the maximum payo of the seller on the set of MN
solutions is equal to the minimum payo of the seller on the set of Core solutions
and on the set of Competitive outcomes. So, in this region we have that at any MN
solution the dominant seller sells the item at a price which is at most equal to the
price at any Core (Competitive) outcome. This is because the MN solution allows
that the (inecient) pair [2; 3] forms and player 2 is not willing to pay a price above
w2 + 2.
In region A1b the payo of the seller on the set of MN solutions is at most equal
to his payo in the VNM vector, i.e., at any MN solution the item is sold against a
price at most equal to the price at the VNM tuple. However, remember that at any
MN solution the seller is sure to be in the pair that forms, whereas at the VNM
vector also the pair of buyers can form. Moreover, since 2 >
w1−w2
2 we have that
the minimal Competitive price w2 + 2 is higher than the maximal price
w1+w2
2
on the set of MN solutions. So, again we observe that the dominant player suers
from the lock-in eect. Once a pair is formed with one of the buyers, the two buyers
can not be played o against each other any longer.
In the region A1c the value of the externality of player 2 becomes so large that
competition does not lead to a solution. Now, the only possibility for the seller to
sell the item is to start negotiations with one of the two buyers. As soon as he has
formed a pair with one of these buyers, he suers again from the lock-in eect.
Finally, observe that in the region A1 the minimum payo of the seller on
the set of MN solutions increases in the value of 1. In fact, an increase of 1
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brings the seller in a better position. An increase in 2 has a positive eect on
the Competitive price, but also makes it more attractive for the buyers to avoid
competitive behavior. For 2 high enough the seller can not take advantage any
longer from the competition between the buyers.
In the region A2 buyer 2 becomes the modal player and buyer 1 the dominated
player. Now the minimum payo of the seller on the set of MN solutions increases
in 2 instead of 1.
In region B buyer 1 is the dominant player. In region B1 (the seller is the modal
player) the minimum payo of buyer 1 on the set of MN solutions is equal to
w1−1
2 . So, at the right side of the (dashed) line 1 = w1 there are solutions in
which player 1 is willing to pay a price above w1 if he forms a pair with the seller
or to pay a compensation if he forms a pair with buyer 2. So, in this case we have
the striking result that there are solutions in which the dominated buyer 2 gets a
positive and the dominant player is willing to accept a loss.
In region B1a the maximum payo of buyer 1 on the set of MN solutions is
equal to u1 = 2. This is equal to the minimum payo of buyer 1 on the set
of Core solutions. So, in this region we have again that at any MN solution the
payo of the dominant player is at most equal to his payo at any Core solution.
Observe that this payo is increasing in 2 and hence the corresponding payo
of the seller is decreasing in 2. So, the maximum price according to the Core
solution and the minimum price according to the MN solution are decreasing in
the externality of buyer 2. An increase in the externality of this buyer puts his
competitor in a better bargaining position with respect to the seller. This is because
the willingness of buyer 2 to pay a compensation for an agreement not to buy
becomes larger. Since 2  w1−w22 we also have that for any MN solution there is a
Competitive outcome which gives the dominant buyer 1 a higher payo. Moreover,
the Competitive outcomes guarantees buyer 1 a payo of at least zero.
In region B1b the Core is empty. Analogous to region A, in this case we have
again that the payo of the dominant player on the set of MN solutions is at most
equal to his payo in the VNM vector. However, remember again that at any MN
solution buyer 1 is sure to be in the pair that forms, whereas at the VNM vector also
the pair [2; 3] can form. The minimum payo of the dominant player on the set of
MN solutions is equal to w1−12 . Above the dashed line 2 =
w1+1
2 −w2 this payo
is higher than the maximum payo on the Competitive outcome. Below the dashed
line the minimum payo of buyer 1 on the set of MN solutions is below his maximum
payo of the Competitive outcomes and for high values of 1 there even exist MN
solutions with a negative payo for buyer 1, whereas all Competitive outcomes
yield a non-negative payo. So, for high values of 1 buyer 1 prefers competition,
for values of 1 above the dashed line buyer 1 prefers an MN solution. The reverse
is true for the seller, provided that he is in the pair that forms. The dominated
buyer 2 never prefers competition, because he always looses the competition and
gets a payo of −2. Any MN solution gives buyer 2 at least the same payo and
a higher payo if he is in the pair that forms.
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In region B1c the maximum payo of the dominant player 1 on the set of MN
solutions is equal to the VNM payo, whereas his minimum payo decreases in 1.
In region B2 buyer 2 becomes the modal player. In this case the minimum payo
of the dominant player equals 2−12 and hence is negative below the dashed line
2 = 1 in Fig. 1. Below this line the dominant buyer is willing to pay a price
above his reservation value w1 or to compensate buyer 2 for an agreement not to
buy. We also see that the minimum payo of buyer 1 increases in 2. So, when
forming a pair with the seller this means that the maximum price decreases in 2
and hence an increase in the externality of the modal buyer 2 weakens the position
of the dominated seller in bargaining with buyer 1. This is because an increase
in the externality of buyer 2 makes him willing to increase his compensation to
player 1 for getting an agreement not to buy.
Region C2 is analogous to region B2 with a change of roles between the two
buyers. Now buyer 2 is the dominant buyer. His minimum payo on the set of
MN solutions is 1−22 and hence is increasing in 1, So, the maximum price is
decreasing in 1. Above the dashed line 2 = 1 + 2(w1 − w2) we have that the
minimum payo of buyer 2 is less than w2 − w1, i.e., buyer 2 is willing to pay
more than the reservation value w1 of buyer 1. In region C1 the maximum payo of
the dominant buyer 2 is equal to his payo at the VNM vector, while his minimum
payo is decreasing in 2. So, in this case the price does not depend on 1 and is
increasing in 2. Above the dashed line 2 = 2w1 − w2 buyer 2 is willing to pay a
price above w1.
One nal remark is in place. As mentioned before the MN solution captures
the situation of imperfect competition among the three participants and in case no
pair is Nash-dominant it is the dominant player who suers from this imperfect
competition. In region A, which includes the standard case without externalities,
the seller is the dominant player. Hence, imperfect competition implies that the
seller receives a price that is either the price corresponding to the VNM vector or
at most the lowest price corresponding to the Core. Note that the seller, as the
dominant player, is always included in the pair that forms (except if the MN vector
equals the VNM vector). In regions B and C the seller is not the dominant player
and one of the buyers suers from imperfect competition. This is reflected in the
fact that every MN price is at least the price corresponding to the VNM vector. This
leads to the paradox that negative buyer externalities and imperfect competition
raises the price paid for the good. This \higher" price is however not without costs
for the seller, because the seller is not automatically included in the pair that forms.
So, the seller only benets from imperfect competition if he is included in the pair
that forms.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the one-seller/two-buyer problem of bargaining in
case of externalities between the buyers and the presence of legal opportunities for
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cooperation between the two buyers, i.e., they can commit not buying the object
and paying a monetary transfer among them. If the externalities are large compared
to valuations and if buyers can cooperate, then one should expect that coalitions
between buyers form in small markets. In the existing literature [e.g., Jehiel and
Moldovanu (1995, 1996)] cooperation between the two buyers is not taken into ac-
count. For the standard market problem without externalities there is no dierence
in results between the two cases, but our analysis shows that it does matter in the
presence of buyer externalities.
In order to study these markets the problem is modeled as a three-player/three-
cake problem and the cooperative solution concepts of the Core, the Bargaining set,
the Stable set and the Multilateral Nash solution are applied and their outcomes
are compared with the Competitive outcome, as far as the latter exists. We have
shown that the Competitive outcome exists as long as the sum of the externality
value 2 and the reservation value w2 of the weakest buyer is smaller than the
reservation value w1 of the strongest buyer. Moreover, the set of Core outcomes is a
strict subset of the set of Competitive outcomes, which is quite dierent result than
for the standard case with zero externalities. Finally, all standard results known for
the one-seller/two buyer problem without externalities can be obtained as the limit
result by letting the externalities vanish and, hence, the standard results are robust
with respect to small externalities.
The non-existence of the Competitive equilibrium as well as the Core is a serious
drawback of these concepts, because this implies that these concepts fail to provide a
satisfying answer to the economic problem. The Bargaining set is able to produce an
answer for the whole class of one-seller/two-buyer problems with buyer externalities.
A remarkable result is that, if the Core is empty, all three pairs may form and that
the payos of the participants in each pair do not depend on the externalities but
only on the buyer valuations w1 and w2 of the buyers. If the seller is included in
the pair that forms and, thus, the object is sold, then the seller obtains the average
of the buyer valuations w1 and w2. This price is always included in the set of
Core prices, provided the Core is not empty. If instead the pair of the two buyers
forms and, thus, the good is not sold, then it is always the buyer with the lowest
valuation who makes a monetary transfer equal to half of (the absolute value of
the) dierence between the buyers’ valuations to the other buyer. This transfer is
equal to the foregone consumer surplus of the buyer with the highest valuation
that would have been obtained if this buyer buys the object. Thus, similar as in
the standard case without externalities the asymmetry between the two buyers is
based upon the asymmetry in valuations w1 and w2.
Finally, the Bargaining set represents a solution for markets with perfect com-
petition. Markets with imperfect competition, such as lock-in eects for one of
the participants, exists as well. We have implicitly investigated markets with
imperfect competition by looking at the MN solution. We dened the notion of
a dominant player and saw that this player is always included in the pair that
forms (neglecting the MN solution that coincides with the VNM vector). Imperfect
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competition is bad for the dominant player, because this player is not able to fully
play o the other two players as would have been the case with perfect competition.
For small buyer externalities the seller is the dominant player (just as in the case
without externalities) and, hence, the seller is always included in the pair that forms
and the seller suers from the imperfect competition because the resulting price is
lower than the price that would have been obtained under perfect competition.
However, for larger buyer externalities the seller is no longer the dominant player.
Since one of the buyers is the dominant player this buyer will suer from imperfect
competition and, hence, this yields the paradox that the price of the object is higher
under imperfect competition than under perfect competition. Since the seller is not
automatically included in the pair that forms it is clear that the seller only benets
from imperfect competition if he is included in the pair that forms.
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